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Abstract
In this paper we discuss some fundamental security issues of distributed systems of weak de-
vices. We briefly describe two extreme kinds of such systems - the sensor network and theRa-
dio Frequency IDentification (RFID) system from the point of view of security mechanisms
designer. We describe some most important particularities and issues (including unsolved
problems) that have to be taken into account in security design and analysis. Finally we
present some fundamental concepts and paradigms of research on security of weak devices. In
the paper we also give a brief survey of ultra–light HB/HB+ - family of encryption schemes
and so-called predistribution protocols.
1. Introduction
Systems† of constrained devices are more and more common and their indus-
trial/military importance is still growing. An obvious question is how to provide
security for such systems. We bear in mind, in some sense, two extreme models
- the first represented by a network of sensors, the other one is a system of
RFID-tags (i.e. Radio Frequency IDentification). It is believed that ensuring
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an adequate level of security is a necessary condition of further development of
systems of that type. On the other hand, one can observe that security issues
are definitely neglected in many already implemented systems.
In this paper we discuss several main security problems of weak devices. We
explain why constructing security mechanisms is so difficult for constrained
devices. We also show that in many cases security mechanisms of these systems
have to be completely different when compared to typical “high-end“ systems.
We describe several typical techniques and tricks commonly used in such
systems. In particular, we discuss predistribution protocols (typical of sensors)
and family of HB protocols (designed for the RFID systems). We show that
such security mechanisms are completely different from typical well-examined
protocols like RSA. In particular, protocols and their analysis are based on
different (compared with typical cryptography) metamathematical objects and
tools.
1.1. Organization of this paper
Section 2 is devoted to description of systems of weak devices with partic-
ular focus on security issues. In Sections 3 and 4 we describe basic security
problems, attacks as well as countermeasures. In Section 5 we discuss predis-
tribution schemes for wireless sensor networks. In Section 6 we describe family
of HB authentication protocols. Non-algorithmic, yet very important issues are
discussed in Section 7. We conclude in 8.
2. Particularities of systems of small devices
In this section we briefly outline two, in some sense extreme, kinds of systems
of weak devices - the sensor network and the RFID system. We point out to
their peculiarities and applications. Then we try to explain why providing
security to systems of weak devices is so demanding in general.
Sensor network. - by this term we mean a system of small devices distributed
usually over a very large area in order to measure some environmental features
(e.g temperature, humidity). Such system is usually very long lasting - in
some cases it can be used for many years without any supervision in an open
environment. Devices (sensors) have moderate memory (enough to keep several
cryptographic keys) and computational power that allows to find values of one-
way (in practice) hash function (e.g. SHA-256). In realistic time it is not
feasible, however, to perform asymmetric cryptography. Sensors usually have a
battery that in practice cannot be replaced. For these reasons algorithms need
possibly to reduce communication - especially broadcasting. In some scenarios
all sensors can communicate directly - in such a case we call the network single
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hop. Otherwise, in a multi-hop network some nodes have to communicate via
intermediate nodes.
Sensor networks are used not only for monitoring the environment but also for
military purposes (e.g detecting movement of troops in a battlefield). Extended
description of sensor networks and their applications can be found for example
in [1].
RFID. - Radio Frequency IDentification are the systems composed of ultra
weak devices called tags (or transponders) and so-called readers (or transceivers).
A tag can be seen as a piece of memory that can be read from a short or mod-
erate distance. They have minimal (if any) computational power that allows to
perform basic operations (addition, xoring of small numbers). In extreme cases
they have no computational power at all - they just respond with a static iden-
tifier on each reader’s query. Readers have abilities (computations, memory,
energy) comparable with the regular PC. In the system the reader is connected
with a back end data-base that collects all data about tags. Thus the reader
communicating with the tag can recognize it and then get much more informa-
tion about it from the data-base.
Most of the tags, (e.g., so-called passive tags) do not have any inner source
of energy. The energy necessary for replying the reader’s query is supplied by
RF of the reader. It is commonly assumed that the “middle-class“ tag of rea-
sonable size and cost e.g. the EPC class 1 should not have more than 2k logical
gates. Note that it is not feasible to implement regular symmetric encryption
protocol using such resources, since regular logical circuit realizing symmetric
encryption protocol needs more than 20k logical gates. Even extremely elabo-
rated implementations of AES need more than 5k logical gates ([2]). Extended
description of the RFID system with particular attention to application and
security threads can be found in [3].
The RFID systems were initially designed as successors of Universal Prod-
uct Code (UPC) (the barcode found on most consumer products) in logistic
chains. Thanks to the RFID-tags one simultaneously lists all products in the
box without first unpacking all items. Recently, RFID has grasped much wider
applications in sorting or detecting a variety of objects including goods, animals
or even people. In particular, they are used for logical/physical access control,
speed control, payment systems or even localizing devices for securing tickets
or high value chips in casinos.
Noondays there are many thousand of millions of already produced RFID-
tags [3]. Most of the tags are standardized as the Electronic Product Codes
(EPC)-tags ([4]). This is an open and flexible standard that assigns each item
a globally unique label.
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There were some very spectacular implementations of RFID technology - for
example in the US Department of Defense, Procter and Gamble and Wal-Mart
chain, where the technology has made some logistic processes three times faster
([5])
In fact, it is not feasible to precisely distinguish “regular systems” from “sys-
tems of small devices” - there are many systems of intermediate capabilities that
should be placed between the RFID-tags and the sensors. The fact remains,
however, that there are some systems that need special algorithmic approach
due to their specific features and strict constraints. Such systems very often
process important data that have to be protected. Nevertheless, there are some
peculiarities that make system of weak devices hard to protect in a proper way.
• Devices have constrained computational power and memory. Thus
it is not possible to use advanced cryptographic methods. Similarly,
due to the constrained memory, it is not feasible to use methods with
limited computation but high memory requirements (e.g. one-time
signatures).
• Energetic constraints cause limitations in communication (broadcast-
ing). Thus in some models limited communication is one of the most
important evaluation metrics of the algorithm ([6]). Energy resources
are also very important in defining the adversary. Indeed, in some
cases it is not possible to provide a high level of security if the ad-
versary has unlimited energy. On the other hand, it is possible if we
assume some constraints on the number of adversarial broadcasts [7].
• Typically, case systems of constrained devices work on a very vast
(even unpredictable) area that cannot be supervised. Thus construct-
ing mechanisms needs to take into account that the adversary can have
physical access to parts of the system. For that reason, it is a realistic
assumption that some devices can be seized and corrupted by the ad-
versary. On the other hand, the legitimate user cannot simply replace
damaged device or change the code executed by them.
• Devices communicate using a radio channel - thus one needs to take
into account that sent messages may be eavesdropped and the connec-
tion is not reliable (due to e.g interferences, noise).
Such systems are distributed and thus inherit all problems typical of secu-
rity issues of distributed systems including possible delays and synchronization
problems and in some models difficulties induced by multiple access channel
or limited bandwidth , etc. Additionally, sensor networks work often in a so-
called ad hoc mode - for example they are spread from the plane. Thus we have
no a priori knowledge of network configuration after deployment. Devices are
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placed at random and some of them may be even destroyed. It is clear that
such a network needs to execute some self-organizing preprocedure.
As we can see, designing security mechanisms for low-end devices is a very
demanding task. On the other hand, there are only few peculiarities that make
design of systems easier.
• size of processed data is usually significantly smaller when compared
with a regular system - thus usually one can use very particular mech-
anisms designed only for short or moderate length messages.
• since in most of scenarios the system works on a large area we can safely
assume that the adversary can control/eavesdrop only some parts of
the system at the same time. ([8])
3. Security aspects of systems of weak devices
As we can see, constructing algorithms for the system described in the pre-
vious sections is much more difficult than for the regular ones due to very
strict constraints and assumptions implied by practical demands. One may
be tempted to neglect importance of security methods for small devices since
smaller devices are more and more powerful. One can imagine that finally the
RFID-tag would be have power of a regular PC.
On the other hand, there is still the need of creating smaller tags - note for
example μ - tag constructed by HITACHI [9]. Even though this device is smaller
than half square millimeter, there are still plans to make its second, much
smaller generation. Additionally, there is price pressure to produce cheaper and
cheaper tags. Indeed - industry needs to label cheaper and cheaper products. It
is hard to imagine that one could accept a tag more expensive than the object
bearing it.
3.1. Aims and possible threads
Generally speaking security aims of the system based on small devices are the
same as in the regular “high-end” systems. At first, some of typical security
properties will be discussed. Most of the security research devoted to weak
devices discusses:
• confidentiality - only legitimate parties should have access to the data;
• integrity - data cannot be changed in an illegal way;
• availability - the legitimate user should always be able to have access
to data;
• privacy of users - understood in many ways. In most cases this prop-
erty boils down to preventing any party from getting any additional
knowledge.
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In literature many attacks against the described systems have been discussed
so far. Some interesting examples are:
• Sybil attack - adversary tries to gain influence on the system more
significantly than proportional to the resources under its control. For
example, a single physical device can pretend several identities have
greater influence on the whole system ([7]).
• DoS - the aim of the adversary is to make executing the protocol/
access to some data impossible.
• Capturing - the adversary may take control over some devices and
change their behaviour (e.g using a modified code)
• Cloning - the adversary can make copies of devices.
Privacy threads. Attacks against privacy are, in principle, discussed only in
the context of RFID-systems. In the basic scenario the problem with privacy is
as follows - the bearer of an object with the tag can be easily traced. Moreover,
such remote tracing can be in practice unnoticeable. Combining information
from the tag with other data (e.g time, patterns of behaviour) can reveal some
other information about individuals. There are many lines of protecting from
this threat. One of possible methods is “ kill command“ – e.g. the tag is
permanently switched off (e.g. after an item is sold). However, this strongly
limits expected functionality of the system. Another approach is putting the
tag in a Faraday cage or using special devices that generate noise and jam
communication. Thus, as long as the jammer is switched on, no communication
with the tag is possible. Both solutions are not feasible in most applications.
In [10] the lightweight method called pseudonym throttling has been suggested
wherein passwords are cyclically changed. The Reader can communicate with
the tag only after sending a password. The adversary has to eavesdrop many
times to carry out a successful attack. The survey of similar methods is given
in [3].
It should be stressed, however, that none of these methods may ensure perfect
privacy. Indeed, note that even encrypted communication if detected by the
adversary can reveal some information.
4. Light–weight methods
Security mechanisms for constrained devices have gained significant attention
for many years. There is a long list of protocols that try to provide security
protection methods with computational/memory/communicational constraints.
This line of research is sometimes called light–weight cryptography. Such pro-
tocols were motivated not only by constraints of devices but also the need of
having extremely efficient protocols or even to by-pass some legal restrictions
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([11]) In most cases the presented methods are based on computing values of
a one-way hash function using constant-size memory.
Having solely the ability of computing values of one-way hash function one
can implement quite a rich collection of protocols, including digital signatures
e.g. Lamport signatures ([12]) or more efficient in terms of memory Winter-
litz signatures. In Section 5 we recall protocols for key-establishment and key
management. Of course, one can also implement various challenge-response
protocols. Some elaborated constructions are surveyed in [1]. There are, how-
ever, some theoretical limitations of functionality that can be accomplished
using only one-way hash functions (e.g. [13]).
The protocols presented above, suitable for sensors, are out of reach of typical
RFID-tags. For those devices some special protocols are designed. An example
of such ultra-lightweight approach is given in Section 6.
Solutions for low-end RFID-tags. One needs to take into account that most
tags have no computational power at all. Of course, they cannot implement
any even ultra light-weight cryptographic methods. Fortunately, there are some
methods that allow to implement security mechanisms even for such devices.
Of course, such security is very limited.
The methods described below do not require any computations on the tag’s
side. They can be also used together with other mechanisms to support the
overall level of security. One approach is to use a very slow-charging capacitor
in the tag. Such tag needs significant amount of time to collect energy for
answering the reader’s query. Thanks to it, in order to read the tag the reader
needs longer time of communication. This, to some extent, protects the users
from unwanted reading of tags they possess - especially if the tags are in move.
Even more important is the fact, that a number of queries the tag can answer
is strictly limited. In realistic scenarios this feature does not restrict usability.
On the other hand, it protects from some attacks wherein the adversary needs
to collect a sufficient, usually large number, of tag answers [14, 15].
Another non-algorithmic way of securing the tag was presented in [16]. In
this paper the authors propose to remove part of the tag antenna to reduce the
distance of reading. The idea is very realistic, however, only in some scenarios.
For example in a shop, after the an item is sold, a shortened antenna protects
the buyer’s privacy. On the other hand, if necessary, the tag can be read (e.g.
customer’s claim) but only from a very short range.
Some physical methods are very effective but their application is limited to a
very particular case. For example in some countries (including Poland and the
UK) there are RFID-tags in passports. The cover of the passport has embedded
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a Faraday cage. If the covers are open the tag can be read. Otherwise, covers
protect from unwanted reading.
Paper [17] describes a protocol that requires that memory of the tag can be
overwritten. Idea of the protocol is as follows – readers in each communication
change slightly the state of the memory. Legitimate readers can easily trace
tags, however if the passive adversary (eavesdropper) skips some changes, it
cannot recognize the traced tag anymore. Security of this simple protocol is
reduced to the analysis of a random walk on a hypercube.
5. Predistribution schemes
Devices like sensors can efficiently use symmetric ciphers like AES. How to
encrypt messages in a sensor network using only symmetric ciphers ? The
problem is with the proper key establishment. One of possible approaches is to
choose before deployment one single secret key shared by all devices. As long as
the adversary is passive, confidentiality of exchanged messages is guaranteed.
The adversary can, however, decrypt all messages in the network seizing even
a single device. Due to vulnerability of nodes to physical capture such strategy
is unacceptable. Another extreme (and naive) approach it to give each sensor
a different key. In such scenario, devices cannot decrypt exchanged messages
without exchanging keys. This, however, would demand asymmetric methods.
One of the most exploited lines of research on security for weak devices in
the context of sensor networks is predistibution, that can be seen as a trade-
off between those two strategies. The idea is as follows. At the beginning a
pool of secret keys K of cardinality k is chosen. Before the devices are placed
in the target environment, each of them gets a subset of K of cardinality n.
If n = Θ(
√
k) is chosen carefully, then each pair of devices has at least one
common key w.h.p (due to birthday paradox) and can exchange messages. On
the other hand, an adversary capturing a single sensor is not able to decrypt
all messages exchanged in the network. That is - the attack is local. This idea
was introduced in the seminal paper [18].
The first improvement of this protocol was proposed in [19], wherein the au-
thors suggested to force sensors to use q > 1 keys to initiate communications.
Its a results, two sensors should have at least q common keys to communicate.
Moreover, each message is encrypted using q common keys. Thus each pair
of sensors uses one of
(
k
q
)
instead of one of k combination keys from K. The
adversary capturing a single sensor is very unlikely to be able to decrypt com-
munication of any other pair. On the other hand, such approach has also some
drawbacks - to have at least constant probability (with respect to k) that two
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sensors have q common keys, we need n = Ω(k
q−1
q ). Even for moderate q sen-
sors need much more memory. What is more important, the adversary seizing
any sensor collects more nodes. It turns out that this approach is better only
if we assume that the adversary can collect a small number of sensors.
Small, yet very efficient improvement was proposed [20]. In this paper the
authors suggest treating a set K as a projective space. Instead of random
subsets of K, each sensor gets exactly one line of a projective space. Thus
every two sensors have exactly one common key.
Another approach, calledMultipath Key Reinforcement,presented in [19] sug-
gests routing messages through several indeterminate nodes. To decrypt a mes-
sage, the adversary needs much more keys.
Key-evolution protocols. Another interesting notion strongly connected with
predistribution schemes is key evolution protocols. This mechanism is simple,
yet very effective. The idea behind it is as follows - sensors use a fixed key just
for a short period. In the next period the key is changed in a pseudo-random
manner. The adversary that captures some keys in period t is not able to de-
crypt messages in period t+ 1 (forward security) or t− 1 (backward security).
In paper [6] a key evolution protocol with forward security has been proposed.
Protocol from [21] offers both forward and backward security. It is interest-
ing that the key evolution protocols can be constructed without asymmetric
cryptography using only one-way hash function.
6. HB/HB+ -type Protocols
In this section we describe one of the most important types of ultra-lightweight
authentication scheme, called HB. A very simple construction and a clear math-
ematical model made that the basic scheme and its numerous extensions gained
significant attention in literature. The HB protocol was introduced in the con-
text of RFID-systems in [22], however, it is based on human-to-computer au-
thentication protocol designed by Hopper and Blum ([23]). In principle, HB is
an authentication protocol - i.e., the tag would like to authenticate itself to the
reader.
6.1. HB-protocol description
Let x = x1, x2, . . . xn , y = y1, y2, . . . yn be two bit-stings of the length n. We
define a dot product < x, y >=
∑
xiyi mod 2. By x⊕ y we denote a bit-wise
xor of strings x, y. Let x ∈R A denote an element x chosen at random from the
set A.
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In the HB protocol, a secret key is a n-bit string x shared between the reader
and the tag. Additionally, the protocol depends on two parameters N - i.e., a
number of rounds and a parameter ε < 1/2.
HB protocol
Public parameters: n
Secret key: x ∈R {0, 1}n
Parameter: L = 0
Following procedure is repeated N times:
Reader Tag
Chooses a ∈R {0, 1}n
a−→
Sets v := 1 with prob. ε, else v := 0
Computes r :=< x, a > ⊕v
r←−
If r =< x, r > than L := L+ 1;
The tag is accepted iff L ≥ (1− ε)N
6.1.1. HB-security of the protocol
The basic considered security model is as follows – the tag and the reader
share a key. The adversary has to prove its identity to the reader. The adversary
eavesdrops communication between the tag and the reader and its aim is to
clone the tag or at least to mimic the legitimate tag. The adversary cannot
seize the tag or communicate with the tag or the reader.
Under such conditions the security of the HB schemes is provable. More
precisely learning parity with noise problem (LPN) is shown to be reducible
to finding the secret key of HB. LPN itself was proved to be NP-hard [24].
Inapproximability of this problem (with factor two) has been shown in [25].
Despite the reduction, security analysis is not fully convincing - this reduction
does not tell about security of a typical instance of the problem. Moreover, in
recent years there have been several attacks against the LPN problem. Most of
them (e.g. LF2 from [26] or [27]) are tune-ups of the BKW algorithm (Blum,
Kalai, Wasserman 2003) [28] that has subexponential runtime O(2klog k) .
The fact remains, however, that the reduction is a relatively strong evidence
for using the HB protocol.
One can easily observe that assumptions are important. If the adversary
could adaptively query the tag, it would retrieve the key bit by bit using Ω((1−
2ε)−2) queries and simple Gaussian elimination (w.h.p.).
It is believed that the HB protocols protects also privacy, nevertheless this
property has not formally been proven up to now.
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6.2. HB+
HB+ is an augmented version of the HB protocol and was proposed already
in [22]. As mentioned in the previous subsection, HB protects only against
passive adversary limited to eavesdropping communication between a legitimate
tag and a legitimate reader. The new version of the protocol was designed in
order to protect the communication against an active adversary.
HB protocol
Public parameters: n
Secret key: x ∈R {0, 1}n, y ∈R {0, 1}m
Parameter: L = 0
Following procedure is repeated N times:
Reader Tag
b ∈R {0, 1}m
b←−
Chooses a ∈R {0, 1}n
a−→
Sets v := 1 with prob. ε, else v := 0
Computes r :=< x, a > ⊕ < y, b > v
r←−
If r =< x, r > ⊕ < y, b > than L := L+ 1;
The tag is accepted iff L ≥ (1− ε)N
The exemplary parameters considered in practice are as follows ε = 1/4 ,
N = 1164. The lengths of x and y are 80 and 512 respectively.
As one can see the main difference is that HB+ protocol is a commitment-
challenge-response protocol. The tag sends a vector b as an additional blinding
factor . It was proved in [22] that HB+ is secure against active adversary in
the so-called detection-based model (LPN reduction). The extended security
analysis of this scheme was shown in [29, 30] also for some modifications of
HB+. However, the assumed model does not take into account that the adver-
sary can communicate with the reader. It turns out that the adversary capable
of communicating with the reader can mount a man-in-the middle attack in a
very efficient way as shown in [31]. The attack can retrieve the key in a linear
number of queries. Some other attacks against this protocol have also been
shown in [32] and [33].
6.3. Other schemes from the HB family
Next, a natural step in research was to construct a protocol immune against
Man-in-the-middle attack. There have been several published protocols so far.
Below we list the most notable of them.
HB#: was introduced in [34]. The proposed solution was based on the
Toeplitz matrices in order to make the scheme even more efficient in
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terms of computation. Some security shortcomings of this scheme were
shown in [35] .
HB-PUF: The protocol introduced in [36] is based on Physically Un-
clonable Function (PUF). The PUF mechanism is based on small, “
unpredictable“ in practice variances typical of each integrated circuit.
It is assumed that two circuits have different responses as PUF even
if they are logically the same. It is hard to judge how practical the
solution is.
Trusted-HB: This protocol was introduced in [37]. It combines the ba-
sic HB+ with lightweight signing mechanisms from [38]. The protocol
was, however, efficiently attacked in [39] .
HB++: The protocol was shown in [40]. It runs regular HB+ proto-
cols with different secrets and correlated challenges. The protocol was
attacked in [41].
HB-MP: Has been presented in [42] as a more immune and more effi-
cient version of HB+ protocol.
6.4. Similar methods
There are some protocols offering similar functionality and having similar
requirements. One of them is CKK ([14]). This protocol offers much weaker
security (in terms of a number of eavesdropped queries), however the security
analysis is very precise. Extensions of the basic CKK scheme were attacked in
[43] and [15].
7. Theory vs. Practice
Except for algorithmic issues discussed in the previous sections there are also
many other problems in implementing security methods in the system of weak
devices that need to be handled.
7.1. Source of randomness
Security algorithms strongly depend on quality of randomness. In many
cases if the adversary has access to a source of randomness generated locally in
devices, then breaking the system is a trivial task. In some cases if the source
of data is even slightly biased, then the adversary can carry out very efficient
attacks. How to generate random bits in weak devices? Of course, a sensor
cannot use classic methods like those based on HDD movement. In the case
of devices of moderate capacities a reasonable thing to do is to use a one-way
hash function with random seeds r0, s. Then the i-th random sequence can be
computed as ri = H(ri−1, s). The quality of randomness can be improved using
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deterministic functions, the so-called extractors if several independent sources
of random bits (possibly of low quality) are available.
Such generation of random bits is out of reach even for the advanced RFID
tags. In research papers published recently we can find several approaches.
The most typical is to use some external noise (e.g. thermal noise) and am-
plify it using a simple electronic circuit. Somehow similar idea is based on an
accelerometer integrated with the tag. Both methods can be somehow prob-
lematic in very static systems.
Substantially different and very promising is a method called FRENS pro-
posed in [44]. The authors propose to use the initial state of SRAM (Static
Random-Access Memory) that tends to be very unstable and, to some extent,
“unpredictable”.
To the best of our knowledge there is no provably secure method of random
bit generation implemented in the RFID-tags.
7.2. Non–technical problems
Another issue is social acceptance of ubiquitous technology. In particular,
RFID-technology raises a number of concerns regarding privacy. It should be
noted that in many cases even issuers of tags or manufacturers do not know
what is the effective range of communication with the tag. Moreover, customers
may not know if they have any tag or if it is still functional. This is not only
a problem of personal location privacy but also combining data from the tag
with other data that can together reveal a lot of sensitive information about
individuals. Due to possible DoS attack or risk of industrial espionage RFID
technology is also found insecure in some corporations. It is not clear if the
social acceptance of the technology will be significantly higher when security
mechanisms are better.
Fig. 1. Logo of the anti-RFID campaign by German privacy group
FoeBuD.(From Wikipedia).
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Another problem is with standardization. One can see that there are sev-
eral organizations dealing with the RFID-tags. The most prominent, except
EPCGlobal are the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and
the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC). Thus there is no single
specification - both in data representation and hardware requirements.
8. Conclusions
We presented some problems and methods related to security in the dis-
tributed systems of weak devices. Most of well-known methods designed for
standard devices like PCs cannot be implemented for constrained devices like
the RFID-tags or even sensors. It should be stressed that this is not only a
problem of constrained resources but also other factors like different models of
the realistic adversary.
When comparing with typical systems, those of weak devices have completely
different nature. In particular, one cannot expect the level of security as high as
in typical “high-end” systems. One should rather demand possibly high security
using in advance strictly constrained resources. Another interesting observation
is that protocols designed for weak devices use usually substantially different
mathematical objects as underlying structures - both in construction and the
analysis.
We believe that further development of such systems is strongly dependent
on providing adequate (in terms of cost, robustness as well as usability) secu-
rity mechanisms. The proposed methods definitely do not fulfill all expected
requirements and many important questions are left unanswered (in particu-
lar, in strongly distributed systems like multihop sensor network and highly
dynamic networks). Last but not least, providing a fair level of security to the
systems of weak devices requires not only proper, very fancy algorithms but
also taking into account other factors like physical and organizational (legal)
features.
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